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I. INTRODUCTION
The marketplace metaphor that Justice Holmes deployed in
Abrams v. United States makes “truth” central to the system of free
speech.1 Judges, lawyers, and scholars have now spent a century
unpacking the origins, viability, breadth, alternatives, and desirability of
that metaphor.2 Their inquiries have at least one important question in
common: what did Holmes mean by the “truth” for which the
competition of the marketplace is the best test?

*Lanty

L. Smith ‘67 Professor of Law, Duke Law School. Many thanks to Vince Blasi,
Thomas Healy, James Weinstein, and the other organizers of the symposium on Abrams
v. United States’ centennial held at Columbia Law School on November 8, 2019. Thanks
also to the friends and colleagues who helped me try to identify examples of legal
scholars who have openly repudiated positions they once held. Our collective difficulty
in doing so provided much of the impetus for this Essay, though of course they bear no
blame for any of its flaws.
1 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2 No string cite could possibly suffice, but would have to include ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 73 (1965) (arguing that establishing truth through a
marketplace of ideas “is not merely the ‘best’ test. There is no other.”); Vincent Blasi,
Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1; William P. Marshall, In Defense
of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“In
Speech Clause jurisprudence, for example, the oft-repeated metaphor that the First
Amendment fosters a marketplace of ideas that allows truth to ultimately prevail over
falsity has been virtually canonized.”).
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In his voluminous and often-illuminating private correspondence,
Holmes answered that question with another metaphor: “All I mean by
truth is the road I can’t help travelling.”3 He went on: “What the worth
of that can’t help may be I have no means of knowing. Perhaps the
universe, if there is one, has no truth outside of the finiteness of man.”4
Holmes repeatedly returned to this notion of truth as a “can’t help,”
suggesting that it constitutes a kind of intellectual bedrock (like some
personal preferences) beyond the power of persuasion,5 even while
recognizing that society itself depends on others holding the same “can’t
helps”:
“I can’t help” is the ultimate. If we are sensible men and not
crazy on-ists of any sort, we recognize that if we are in a
minority of one we are likely to get locked up and then find a
test or qualifications by reference to some kind of majority
vote actual or imagined. Of course the fact that mankind or
that part of it that we take into account are subject to most of
the same can’t helps as ourselves makes society possible, but
what interests me is that we start with an arbitrary limit
which I know no reason for believing is a limit to the cosmos
of which I am only a small part.6
One can hear strains of Abrams in the passage. After all, if “[p]ersecution
for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical,”7 then it is
indeed “sensible” to recognize that a minority of one “can’t help” will be
“locked up.”

3 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock (Oct. 27, 1901), in
1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS at 100 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941); Id. at 139 (“[A]ll I mean by
truth is what I can’t help thinking.”) (both cited in Blasi, supra note 2, at 11 n.36).
4 Id.
5 See infra text accompanying note 45 (“Deep-seated preferences cannot be argued
about—you can not argue a man into liking a glass of beer . . . .”). Holmes’s belief that
discussion is eventually pointless and that the cosmos is ultimately unknowable (what
Wittgenstein might call the “ineffable”) do call to mind the famous final line of the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 7 (1961). The Tractatus was
completed in the summer of 1918, as Abrams was making its way to the Court, though it
would not be published until 1921, and then only in German. To my knowledge,
Holmes’s broad and deep reading never included Wittgenstein, but his taste for the
mystical and ineffable—consider the final lines of The Path of the Law—is of a piece.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE PATH OF THE LAW 40–41 (American Classics Library ed.
2012) (“The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it
universal interest. It is through them that you not only become a great master in your
calling, but connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a
glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law.”).
6 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock (Oct. 26, 1929) in
2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, at 255–56 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941).
7 United States v. Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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In other ways, though, Holmes’s notion of truth seems to be in
tension with his embrace of the marketplace metaphor in Abrams. What
is the point of “competition” among things that one “can’t help”? How
can such a “market” ever lead to “acceptance” if none of the participants
can change?
One possibility, of course, is that Holmes meant simply to valorize
the fight and to suggest that we have no choice but to take up arms on
behalf of our own “can’t helps,” even as others do the same for theirs
(and perhaps, we must recognize, with equally good reason). Holmes
was, after all, quite comfortable with martial imagery and the heroism
of doomed, dutiful warriors.8
But the central metaphor in Abrams is the marketplace, not the
battlefield—of “free trade” and “competition,” rather than a bayonet
charge. In that respect, Holmes’s opinion seems to suggest a system of
beliefs that can adapt and change, at the societal and even individual
level. Scholars of Abrams have understandably devoted most of their
attention to Holmes’s remarkable argument for the logic of persecution
and his even more powerful defense of free speech. And yet it is the
pivot point between those themes that is most suggestive of the role of
change in discourse: “[W]hen men have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . .”9
Men can realize; they can come to believe. How? What role is there
for persuasion and change on matters of truth, if “I can’t help is the
ultimate”? Is it only happenstance that “mankind or that part of it that
we take into account are subject to most of the same can’t helps”? If we
find ourselves or others traveling the wrong roads, how can we change
course?
Others have written in great depth about the central role of the
marketplace metaphor in First Amendment law and scholarship,10 and

8 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Soldier’s Faith, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE
HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES 486, 487 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995) (“[T]here is one thing I do not doubt . . .
and that is that the faith is true and adorable which leads a soldier to throw away his life
in obedience to a blindly accepted duty, in a cause which he little understands, in a plan
of campaign of which he has no notion, under tactics of which he does not see the use.”).
9 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
10 See supra note 2. My own attempts to investigate the metaphor have mostly
focused on how it interacts with the institutions and social practices needed to support
the pursuit of truth. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief, 133
HARV. L. REV. 439 (2019); Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE
L.J. 821 (2008).
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what Holmes meant by truth.11 The goal of this Essay is to bring those
two inquiries together, not by mixing metaphors (“the best test of the
road I can’t help travelling is to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market”), but by considering what the “can’t help” vision of truth
means for a system of free speech that presupposes—or at least
prizes—the possibility of change.
In particular, the discussion here will focus on the constitutional
relevance of persuadability—the willingness and ability to change one’s
mind—and how it might factor into the effectiveness of a marketplace
of ideas or any “dynamic” theory of free speech in which the set of ideas
changes.12
Most analyses of free speech dynamism and the
characteristics needed to support it have focused on the persuasiveness
of speakers, or on the degree to which listeners can overcome cognitive
limitations and biases. But persuadability is something different, or at
least the ability to overcome a very specific kind of bias—that in favor
of one’s existing beliefs. It is also distinct from skepticism, which
typically connotes a willingness to doubt premises and beliefs, rather
than a willingness to hold but revise them.
The marketplace metaphor, in other words, seems premised on the
notion that ideas can change, which in turn suggests that people can be
persuaded. Such change and persuasion are easier to observe the
farther one zooms out—groups and societies change their beliefs and
ways of thinking in important and obvious ways that were perfectly
congenial to Holmes.13 He does not seem to have believed in collective
“can’t helps.” The harder question is whether individuals are
persuadable. Here, Holmes seems less optimistic. Perhaps change only
comes intergenerationally, or as open-minded and uninformed people
write beliefs on blank slates, or as certain “can’t helps” are persecuted
or silenced.14

11 See, e.g., Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John
Stuart Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 35 (2010); Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV.
1015, 1039, 1056–57 (2015).
12 See, e.g., GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST
AMENDMENT (2017) (describing a defending “dynamic diversity” as a central free speech
value).
13 See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
14 Blasi, supra note 2, at 26 (internal citation omitted) (“[T]he theory of evolution
might help to explain why a robust freedom of speech can be extremely valuable even
when most individuals remain stubbornly impervious to demonstrably valid refutations
of their beliefs. . . . As the population changes with the infusion of new persons with
different ideas, the pattern of beliefs within the community changes, even if no single
individual ever embraces a new idea or discards an old one.”).
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And yet the Abrams dissent itself appears to be the result of just
such an individual transformation—having spent most of his alreadylengthy career on the bench rejecting free speech claims, Holmes
pivoted into the role that made him a hero for generations of civil
libertarians. Exploring that transformation, and how it came about, may
help shed light on how the opinion is proof of its own concept. And yet
one will not find much help from Holmes himself. As Thomas Healy
notes in his magnificent book on Abrams, the title of which describes
Holmes as having “changed his mind,”15 the Justice seemed to go to great
lengths to deny that such a transformation had taken place.16 That, in
turn, presents the question of whether it is important openly to
acknowledge, and perhaps explain, one’s change of mind.
The modest normative position of this Essay is that it does
matter—that it is a free speech virtue to acknowledge when one has
been persuaded, and that the particular discourse community of law
offers a useful lens through which to consider that virtue. Not only is
persuasion (and therefore, although it receives less attention,
persuadability) central to the very practice of law (and perhaps even
constitutive thereof)17 but law has done more than most disciplines to
self-consciously address changes of mind. This is evident, for example,
in the doctrine of stare decisis, which provides a set of explicit criteria
by which courts and even individual judges (tracking the group versus
individual persuadability distinction) can, and sometimes do, change
their minds.18
And that sets up the second Part of the Essay: a very brief and
speculative foray into persuadability and the legal academy, where the
distinction between individual and group persuasion appears
particularly stark, especially if one is looking for explicit, individual
acknowledgment of a changed position. Schools of thought regularly—
and sometimes quickly—rise and fall, and yet it is difficult to identify
15 THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND—
AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (2013).
16

See infra notes 66–69.
James Boyd White, Law As Rhetoric, Rhetoric As Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 (1985) (“Let us begin with the idea that the
law is a branch of rhetoric. Who, you may ask, could ever have thought it was anything
else?”). See generally JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS
OF THE LAW (1985).
18 To be more precise, the doctrine of stare decisis provides a set of rules for when
the law should change—disagreement with a prior decision (the change of mind) is
necessary but not sufficient. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992)
(articulating various factors to guide the practice of stare decisis). See generally RANDY
J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017) (developing a theory of
continuity in constitutional doctrine).
17
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many examples of individual scholars openly repudiating views they
once held. (Sub silentio change is another matter, and harder to track.)
It is far beyond the scope of this Essay or the ability of its author to
suggest any firm conclusions or broad takeaways in that regard; the goal
is just to offer a tentative observation and situate it in the larger
discussion of persuadability.
And again, Holmes’s private
correspondence offers a distinction that might be useful in partially
addressing it—the distinction between “Thingsters” and “Ideasts.”19
Thingsters are those who master bodies of facts and yearn for rules and
testable hypotheses; Ideasts, of which Holmes counted himself, favor
generalized principles and premises. Thingsters and Ideasts not only
make different kinds of arguments but are persuadable in different ways
as well.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RELEVANCE OF PERSUADABILITY
In the century since Holmes launched the metaphor in Abrams, and
with increasing vigor in recent decades, scholars have picked apart the
assumptions that seem to animate the marketplace metaphor, including
the very basic notion that competition is actually “the best test of truth.”
Much of that literature has focused on the basic cognitive limitations
that make it hard for people to engage with new ideas—racism, sexism,
and other forms of bias being only the most obvious of those limits.20
My focus here is on a particular element of that cognitive task—the
willingness and ability to change one’s mind, to revise or repudiate a
belief one holds. I call this persuadability (and, appropriately enough,
remain very open to revising or repudiating that label).

19

As far as I can tell, the distinction has only been noted once before in the legal
literature. See Charles P. Curtis, 63 YALE L.J. 266, 271 (1953) (reviewing HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS, 1916–1935 (Mark Dewolfe Howe, ed., 1953)) (noting that Holmes, in his own
words, “divided ‘mankind around the two poles of emotion and thought—the poets at
one end and the philosophers at the other.’ ‘I don’t like Goethe. . . . Perhaps at bottom it
is that he is on the side of the poets and I prefer the philosophers. Goethe could not
explain and so he said theory was gray.’ As Holmes said, he and Laski were both ‘ideasts
rather than thingsters.’”). Budiansky suggests that the distinction maps that between
“internal men and external men”—a division proposed by a doctor in his Civil War
regiment. STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A LIFE IN WAR, LAW, AND IDEAS 128
(2019).
20 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications,
and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 673–96 (2006);
Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW.
U. L. REV. 343, 385–86 (1991); Susan H. Williams, Feminist Jurisprudence and Free Speech
Theory, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1563 (1993).
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Although the line is not clear (nor is it all that essential for the
argument), belief-revision is distinct from belief-formation; it is a
specific kind of open-mindedness. It is one thing to be confronted with
a new and disturbing fact—that, for example, the man you thought was
your father has been beheaded by a malevolent boy-king.21 Such
information can be assimilated into one’s mental framework without
the need to displace anything that is already there (other than the belief
that your father is alive). It is quite another thing—and, for most people,
probably a harder one—to be informed that the man you thought was
your father was actually your uncle, your lover is actually your aunt, and
instead of being a bastard you are actually the rightful heir to the
throne.22 Accepting that information requires significant revision of
existing beliefs (“ideas”), which generally presents a different cognitive
task. It is one thing to learn; another to un-learn and re-learn. It might
well be harder to discard an idea than to acquire one.
The willingness and ability to change one’s existing views—to be
persuaded—is also meaningfully distinct from (or at least combines
distinct elements of) skepticism, curiosity, and other character traits
that might make a person sensitive to the “competition” of ideas in the
marketplace.23 In his correspondence with Holmes, Learned Hand
suggested that “incredulity” can provide a basis for protecting free
speech: “Tolerance is the twin of Incredulity,” because we must always
acknowledge that our own presuppositions could be proven incorrect.24
Holmes was unmoved: “If for any reason you did care enough [to stop a
particular speech act] you wouldn’t care a damn for the suggestion that
you were acting on a provisional hypothesis and might be wrong. That
is the condition of every act.”25

21

GAME OF THRONES: BAELOR (HBO television broadcast 2011) (death of Ned Stark).
GAME OF THRONES: WINTERFELL (HBO television broadcast 2019) (Jon Snow learns
his true parentage).
23 Vince Blasi has argued persuasively that Abrams “contains the seeds of an
understanding of the First Amendment that has more to do with checking, character,
and culture than with the implausible vision of a self-correcting, knowledge-maximizing,
judgment-optimizing,
consent-generating
and
participation-enabling
social
mechanism.” Blasi, supra note 2, at 2.
24 Quoted in HEALY, supra note 15, at 23. For an insightful account of Hand’s views,
see James Weinstein, The Story of Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten: Judge Learned Hand,
First Amendment Prophet, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 62 (R. Garnett & A. Koppelman,
eds., Found. Press 2011).
25 HEALY, supra note 15, at 24.
22
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Skepticism comes the closest to persuadability and is a trait often
associated with Holmes himself.26 It has in common with persuadability
a willingness to change and to subject existing beliefs to testing. But
skepticism typically connotes doubt of the truth,27 while a person can
have confident beliefs, even fundamental ones, and still be persuadable.
Skepticism can corrode beliefs; persuadability makes them malleable.
In any event, it is not my intention to attempt a novel intervention in the
epistemological debates. Nothing much turns on the labels, so if
“skepticism” or “adaptability” or something else seems a better fit than
“persuadability” then readers should feel free to make the substitution.
A. Abrams’ Theory of Persuasion
With regard to persuadability, Abrams is more remarkable for what
it shows than what it says; namely, that Holmes himself changed his
mind about the First Amendment, though he was reluctant to admit or
explain the change.28 But even taken on its own terms, the opinion
contains interesting—if indirect and perhaps underappreciated—
language regarding persuadability.
As many have noted, what the concluding paragraphs of the
opinion do for the protection of speech, the opening paragraphs do for
its persecution:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me
perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or
your power and want a certain result with all your heart you
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all
opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate
that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that
he has squared the circle, or that you do not care
wholeheartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your
power or your premises.29

26 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918) (“But while
one’s experience thus makes certain preferences dogmatic for oneself, recognition of
how they came to be so leaves one able to see that others, poor souls, may be equally
dogmatic about something else. And this again means scepticism”). I return to that
passage below. See infra note 46. For a broader account, which includes Holmes, see
Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988). See also
John Inazu, Holmes, Humility, and How Not to Kill Each Other, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1631,
1632 (2019) (arguing that Abrams is best understood as expressing a kind of epistemic
humility, not skepticism per se).
27 See generally PETER KLEIN, SKEPTICISM (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, June
2, 2015), online at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/ (visited June 21,
2019).
28 See infra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
29 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Holmes had hummed these opening bars before in private
correspondence,30 and it is logically consistent with the vision he
sometimes described (and even seemed to celebrate) of a world in
which the strong will ultimately prevail, but all must struggle. And yet,
of course, logic has not been the life of the law; neither could it be the
life of free speech.31 The fact that persecution of disfavored opinions
appears “perfectly logical” is thus not enough to embrace it. Just as
“experience” trumps logic in the development of the law,32 seeing
“fighting faiths” upset should lead men to “come to believe” that the free
trade of ideas must be protected.33
Before he reaches that conclusion, however, Holmes considers (in
the final sentence of the passage above) three other possible
justifications for permitting disfavored speech. The second and third
are that the would-be speech persecutor does not care enough about his
own view prevailing, or that he doubts his power or premises.34 But the
first feint is the most interesting: that failing to persecute an opinion
with which one disagrees may be evidence that one thinks the opinion
“impotent.” If this premise is convincing, it would not be hard to
transform it into an affirmative theory for the protection of speech—
precisely because speech is harmless, the government has no business
regulating it.
But it is evident that Holmes does not believe this to be true. That
speech is, or can be, efficacious is precisely why governments
sometimes seek to stifle it. Again, the pivot point in Abrams drives that
message home, with the notion that “men have realized” and “come to
believe” the basic premises of Holmes’s own theory.

30

In a letter to Laski in July of 1918, he wrote:
My thesis would be (1) if you are cocksure, and (2) if you want it very
much, and (3) if you have no doubt of your power—you will do what
you believe efficient to bring about what you want—by legislation or
otherwise.
In most matters of belief we are not cocksure, we don’t care very
much, and we are not certain of our power. But in the opposite case
we should deal with the act of speech as we deal with any other over
act that we don’t like.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski, (July 7, 1918), in HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS at 160–61 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953).
31 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881); HEALY, supra note 15, at 195
(noting the parallel).
32 HOLMES, supra note 31, at 3.
33 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
34 In his letter to Laski, Holmes suggested that “most matters of belief” fall into this
category. See supra note 30.
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The boundaries of free speech can be drawn based in part on that
very quality—the power of speech to persuade.35 Although Holmes
sometimes casts doubt on the power of speech to persuade, his own
doctrinal solutions seem shaped in no small part by his own belief that
it can. Effectively rejecting the common view that speech can be
punished if it has a “bad tendency” (i.e., a chance, even if remote in odds
and time, of generating bad results36) in Schenck v. United States, Holmes
wrote that the “question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree.”37
Although Holmes found that test satisfied in Schenck—i.e., that the
government could prohibit the speech at issue—his account helped
provide a stronger basis for free speech going forward.38 And, more
importantly for present purposes, it rested in no small part on an
apparent belief that speech can persuade; that people’s minds can be
changed.
Consider the false-shout-of-fire-in-a-crowded-theater
39
hypothetical. One common explanation for why such speech—unlike
other false speech—is punishable is that the circumstances give no
room for counter-speech, for persuasion to run its course.40 Again, it
seems implicit that Holmes believed people could be persuaded, albeit
not in a panicked crowd.
And yet Abrams does not necessarily provide many clues about
how this conversion happens. How does an idea “get itself accepted in
the competition of the market”? If truth is “the road I can’t help
travelling,” can it ever be rerouted? Who or what can be persuaded to
35

To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that speech can be restricted because of its
persuasiveness, only that the persuasiveness of speech factors into its constitutional
treatment. Cf. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991) (arguing that speech cannot be restricted on account of its
persuasiveness).
36 MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 9–12 (2000).
37 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
38 Zechariah Chafee, for one, suggested that the Schenck test could adequately
protect speech, but that Holmes had effectively misapplied it. Zechariah Chafee,
Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 968–69 (1919).
39 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (“The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”). Healy shows
that Holmes lifted the example from federal prosecutor Edwin S. Wertz. HEALY, supra
note 15, at 91.
40 Carlton F.W. Larson, “Shouting ‘Fire’ in A Theater”: The Life and Times of
Constitutional Law’s Most Enduring Analogy, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 181, 183–85
(2015).

BLOCHER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

“THE ROAD I CAN’T HELP TRAVELLING”

10/13/2020 9:40 PM

115

accept new ideas, especially if doing so means changing pre-existing
beliefs?
There are at least two broad possibilities: Groups and societies—
the market as a whole—can adapt. The other, perhaps more
challenging, possibility is that individuals can adapt. The mechanisms
and possibilities for each of these options are quite different.
Descriptively, there is no denying that collectives are
“persuadable” in the sense that prevailing beliefs can and do change.
Recall that the pivot point in Abrams—the point where Holmes shifts
from defending the logic of persecution to erecting a constitutional
barrier against such persecution—refers to “when men have realized
that time has upset many fighting faiths.” Perhaps the use of the plural
(“men,” not “a man”) is simply meant to suggest that a critical mass of
realization is necessary for the marketplace metaphor to be embraced.
But it might also be taken to suggest that society can change, even as
individuals do not.
In a powerful and insightful article distinguishing Holmes’s and
John Stuart Mill’s views of “truth,”41 Irene Ten Cate shows that they had
different views on how beliefs can change over time. As Ten Cate
explains, “Mill’s free speech theory is based on the idea that societal
progress (indispensably fueled by a collective truth-seeking endeavor)
is inextricably connected to individual development.”42 Holmes, by
contrast, “is concerned with neither individual development nor the
discovery of some external truth. Rather, he values speech for its role in
a dynamic process in which shifting interest groups are vying for
dominance in a continually changing world.”43
Moreover, communities are often much more ready to
acknowledge, and even emphasize, the degree to which their collective
ideas have changed. Given the apparent reluctance of many individuals
to acknowledge when they have been persuaded, it is notable that
generations and groups sometimes go so far as to define themselves in
opposition to what has come before. Perhaps that is because the
repudiated ideas were never theirs to begin with. In any event, when
and how that change happens will of course depend on the particular
collective or discourse community at issue—political revolutions and
41 In keeping with my theme, I should acknowledge Ten Cate’s article as one that
persuaded me. She correctly identifies me as one of the scholars guilty of having
“grouped [Mill and Holmes] together as representatives of the ‘marketplace of ideas’
rationale for free speech,” Ten Cate, supra note 11, at 38 n.13, when doing so “ignores
significant differences between their free speech theories, and does not do justice to the
complexity of either defense.” Id. at 81. I can’t help but agree.
42 Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
43 Id.

BLOCHER (DO NOT DELETE)

116

10/13/2020 9:40 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:105

scientific revolutions need not follow the same rules of change. Nor will
change always be easy, or even desirable. The point is simply that
change happens, is acknowledged, and is sometimes even celebrated.
But this kind of change—significant as it may be—does not require
anything of individuals. A thought might “get itself accepted in the
competition of the market” without ever actually persuading a single
person. After all, the participants in the marketplace change over time,
and if an idea sticks around long enough it might gain acceptance in a
new generation without ever shifting the battle lines in an old one.
Persuadability at an individual level presents a much more difficult
problem. Scholars writing on cultural cognition and motivated
reasoning have powerfully—heartbreakingly—argued that people are
not moved by facts and “ideas” in the sense that most marketplace of
ideas theorists probably conceptualize them.44 I have no new empirics
or conceptual frameworks to add to that literature. My more modest
goal is simply to illustrate its stakes for a system of free speech in which
persuadability seems significant to the pursuit of truth. And the most
appropriate place to begin is with Holmes himself.
B. Persuading Holmes
Holmes consistently argued that some beliefs are not subject to
reasoned debate and that some differences of opinion will ultimately be
resolved by violence rather than the competition of ideas in the market.
As he put it, “[d]eep-seated preferences cannot be argued about—you
can not argue a man into liking a glass of beer—and therefore, when
differences are sufficiently far reaching, we try to kill the other man
rather than let him have his way.”45 But Holmes was also perfectly
willing to concede that such dogmas are contingent on, rather than
reflective of, any universal truth: “[T]hat is perfectly consistent with
admitting that, so far as appears, his grounds are just as good as ours.”46
While this leaves open the possibility that people can change their
minds about trifles, it indicates that deep-seated preferences are rooted
in personal experience, and are dogmatic but not universal:
What we most love and revere generally is determined by
early associations. I love granite rocks and barberry bushes,
44 For one such article, focusing on persuasion as such, see Dan M. Kahan & Donald
Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151
U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (2003). Many thanks to Fred Schauer for pointing me to earlier
literature in other disciplines. See, e.g., Rasyid Sanitioso & Ziva Kunda, Ducking the
Collection of Costly Evidence: Motivated Use of Statistical Heuristics, 4 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 161 (1991).
45 Holmes, supra note 26, at 41.
46 Id.
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no doubt because with them were my earliest joys that reach
back through the past eternity of my life. But while one’s
experience thus makes certain preferences dogmatic for
oneself, recognition of how they came to be so leaves one able
to see that others, poor souls, may be equally dogmatic about
something else.47
Efforts to convince one of a different “truth” in such matters are likely to
be perceived, and resisted, as attacks: “If I may quote myself again,
property, friendship, and truth have a common root in time. One cannot
be wrenched from the rocky crevices into which one has grown for
many years without feeling that one is attacked in one’s life.”48
None of this seems to leave much room for individual persuasion
or persuadability, at least not about anything that matters. And yet,
even in his own definition of “truth,” Holmes seemed to acknowledge
some development and change over time:
I used to say, when I was young, that truth was the majority
vote of that nation that could lick all others. Certainly we may
expect that the received opinion about the present war will
depend a good deal upon which side wins, (I hope with all my
soul it will be mine), and I think that the statement was correct
in so far as it implied that our test of truth is a reference to
either a present or an imagined future majority in favor of our
view. If . . . the truth may be defined as the system of my
(intellectual) limitations, what gives it objectivity is the fact
that I find my fellow man to a greater or less extent (never
wholly) subject to the same Can’t Helps.49
Holmes refers to the truth-as-majority definition in the past tense. And
while he defends its partial correctness, he also shifts to the “can’t help”
formulation. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Holmes has found a
way out of his own “rocky crevices”; he has changed his mind.
And that brings us back to Abrams. Less than a year before he
wrote his great dissent, Holmes wrote three other opinions dismissing
First Amendment claims in cases with facts quite similar to Abrams. In
one, he upheld Eugene Debs’ conviction for having illegally obstructed
military recruiting.50 In Schenck, he announced a seemingly speechprotective test but applied it in such a way that upheld the conviction of

47
48
49
50

Id.
Id. at 40–41.
Id. at 40.
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216–17 (1919).
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a person who had criticized the draft.51 And in the third—applying
Schenck—he upheld the conviction of a draft-criticizing newspaper.52
Whether Abrams can be technically squared with these and others
of Holmes’s opinions53 is a matter of scholarly debate.54 Certainly
something changed in 1919. Having written an earlier opinion that
essentially limited the free speech clause to a narrow, Blackstonian
focus on prior restraints,55 Holmes’s opinion in Schenck—while hardly
a civil liberties jeremiad—came very close to acknowledging a change
of heart: “It may well be that the prohibition of laws abridging the
freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to
prevent them may have been the main purpose, as intimated in
Patterson v. Colorado.”56
In Abrams, the change is even more pronounced. As noted above,
Holmes’s opinion rejected the “bad tendency” approach, thereby
providing a stronger basis for protecting free speech claims going
forward. But at the jurisprudential level, the more subtle and
potentially more significant change was that Holmes specifically
embraced the clear and present danger test and, with the marketplace
metaphor, gave it a theoretical justification.57
Indeed, the opinion itself seems to change its mind. As noted above,
Holmes begins by laying out the “perfectly logical” case in favor of
persecuting opinions with which one disagrees. Had he stopped there,
he likely would have been writing a majority opinion, and tilting the
trajectory of free speech in quite a different direction than the one we

51

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
53 See, e.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 276–77 (1915) (upholding conviction
for incitement of nude sunbathing); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)
(holding that First Amendment is focused exclusively on prior restraints, not ex post
punishments for speech); McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass.
1892) (upholding termination of police officer on the basis of his political speech).
54 See, e.g., David S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 99 (1982) (“It is a thesis of this article that the different tone of the
Abrams dissent is not evidence of a marked change in Holmes’s view of free speech, but
is rather the product of Holmes’s frustration at what he considered the misreading by
critics and the public of his position in Schenck.”).
55 Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462.
56 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51–52.
57 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2356 (2000) (noting that Holmes “virtually invented both First
Amendment theory and First Amendment doctrine. He advanced the theory of the
marketplace of ideas, and he demonstrated how doctrine would have to evolve to
correspond to this new theory.”); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First
Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1278 n.97 (2005) [hereinafter Schauer, Towards]
(noting the view that “the First Amendment started in 1919” with Abrams).
52
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are discussing at this symposium.58 But, having given censorship
perhaps the most powerful defense it has ever received in a Supreme
Court opinion, he then pivoted and did the same for freedom of speech.
The fulcrum is persuadability: “when men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths.”
It was not time alone that upset Holmes’s own fighting faith, but a
sustained campaign of personal and intellectual change, driven by
debates with trusted friends. Holmes seemed to regard those one-onone discussions, rather than public discourse and debate, as the most
powerful engine of persuasion. Writing to the diplomat Lewis Einstein,
Holmes reiterated his logic-of-persecution argument with regard to
“fundamental difference[s]” between “side[s],” but suggested that
discussion might be more open and fruitful in “private life”: “I agree that
the logical result of a fundamental difference is for one side to kill the
other, and that persecution has much to be said for it; but in private life
we think it more comfortable for disagreement to end in discussion or
silence.”59
The availability of “discussion” as a remedy to
“disagreement” in “private life” was something which, like love of
granite, had been instilled in Holmes from a young age—his father was,
after all, the Autocrat of the Breakfast Table.60 Throughout his long life,
Holmes’s home was marked by a constant flow of discussion and debate,
and he was of course a common visitor at the “House of Truth.”61
Healy’s account of Abrams fills in the story of an “intense behindthe-scenes effort to change the mind of a legal icon” and of “intellectual
exploration and emotional growth.”62 The protagonists in that story—
the architects of Holmes’s transformation—were friends and colleagues
like Harold Laski, Learned Hand, and Felix Frankfurter, who won him
over with the power of their personal relationships as well as the ideas
they presented. Healy emphasizes that “[t]hrough the intervention of
his friends and his own willingness to adapt, he had come to see free
speech from a different, more personal perspective. And from that
moment forward, he became the champion of the First Amendment we
58 To my knowledge, there have been no symposia marking the centennials of Debs,
Frohwerk, or Schenck. If we were here nine months ago, the tenor and substance of our
discussions would be quite different.
59 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., J. to Lewis David Einstein (July 11, 1918),
reprinted in THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS, 168–69 (J.P. Peabody ed., 1964).
60 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, SR., THE AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST-TABLE (Phillips,
Sampson and Co. 1858).
61 See generally Brad Snyder, The House That Built Holmes, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 661
(2012) (describing Holmes’s interactions with the House, as well as its role in building
his legend).
62 HEALY, supra note 15, at 8.
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know him as today, writing passionate dissents on behalf of radicals and
subversives throughout the rest of his career.”63
Of course, personal interventions will not always persuade, nor will
they always protect speech. After all, three of Holmes’s colleagues
visited him at home—even enlisting the support of his wife, Fanny—in
an unsuccessful effort to persuade him not to issue the Abrams dissent.64
Holmes saw this coming and wrote to Pollock: “I feel sure that the
majority will very highly disapprove of my saying what I think, but as
yet it seems to me my duty. No doubt I shall hear about it on Saturday
at our conference and perhaps be persuaded to shut up, but I don’t
expect it.”65 Holmes thus signaled the possibility of persuasion
(“perhaps be persuaded to shut up”) even as he minimized its likelihood
(“but I don’t expect it”). This general discomfort with the practice of
persuasion raises an important question: did Holmes acknowledge
change, and does it matter if he did?
C. Acknowledging Change
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Holmes changed his mind.
But he was reluctant to acknowledge the change—to show persuasion
at work, and not just to describe and defend it. He wrote in Abrams, “I
never have seen any reason to doubt that the questions of law alone that
were before this Court in the cases of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs were
rightly decided.”66 And yet, as Healy notes, “Holmes purported to stand
by his earlier opinions.”67
That is not to say that Holmes totally denied the change, or that he
refused to acknowledge the influence of Laski, Hand, Zechariah Chafee,
and others who had worked so hard to bring it about. In a later letter to
Chafee explaining his use of the phrase “clear and present danger,”
Holmes wrote, “I think it came without doubt after the later cases (and
probably you—I do not remember exactly) had taught me that in the
earlier Paterson [sic] case, if that was the name of it, I had taken
Blackstone and Parker of Mass. as well founded, wrongly. I simply was
ignorant.”68 As Healy notes (taking the phrase as a chapter title), “I
simply was ignorant. It was the closest Holmes would ever come to

63

Id. at 244.
Id. at 1–5, (“Nowhere else in the annals of the Supreme Court has there been such
a personal appeal to one justice by a group of his colleagues.”).
65 Id. at 213.
66 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 21 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
67 HEALY, supra note 15, at 201; id. at 3 (noting that “something had changed” in
Abrams).
68 Id. at 243 (internal citation omitted).
64
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admitting that he had been wrong. Even in Abrams, he had continued to
insist that Debs and the other cases were correctly decided.”69
Of course, admitting prior ignorance has a different cast than
admitting persuasion. The former is about the acquisition of knowledge,
the latter about the changing of existing beliefs. Holmes seems to cast
the latter as the former. Does acknowledging persuasion matter?
The modest normative claim of this Essay is that it does. It is
important, and a free speech virtue, to acknowledge and explore the
experience of being persuaded. Although it is impertinent even to
suggest it, the Abrams dissent itself might have been an even more
powerful opinion—or at least a more powerful act—if Holmes had made
explicit that he had personally “come to believe” something new; that
his own “fighting faith” had been upset.
That such moments of persuasion may be rare is all the more
reason to call them out when they happen, both for the persuaded
individual and the broader system of free speech. For the individual,
recognizing a change of heart—and calling it what it is—can and should
be a part of intellectual development. We learn not only by acquiring
new facts and information but by revising our beliefs in accordance.
And yet we tend to celebrate the former while downplaying the latter.
The result can only be stifling to the marketplace of ideas.
Psychologists and rhetoricians have undoubtedly studied these
issues in depth, and I make no claims to depth or originality with regard
to human cognition. My more modest goal is to suggest that these issues
matter for the pursuit-of-truth version of free speech. Normalizing
changes of mind can help facilitate them. And that, in turn, would
facilitate the marketplace of ideas, making it easier for “ideas” to get
themselves “accepted” even by people who already have ideas of their
own. After all, there is often no better way to get others to change their
minds than to demonstrate a willingness and ability to change one’s
own.
The point is not that people should repudiate their existing beliefs
in favor of a pointless and weak-minded credulity, nor that every idea is
equally persuasive. It is important, especially in the context of a truthbased account of free speech, to build and maintain the mechanisms of
justified true belief.70 An uncritical and misbegotten persuadability
could potentially contribute to radicalization, paralysis, or anomie: the
“collapse of creeds” that Holmes referenced, decades before Abrams, in
69

Id. at 243.
See generally Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief, supra note 10 (arguing
that justified true belief, rather than truth alone, may provide a better lodestar for an
epistemic theory of free speech).
70
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his “Soldier’s Faith” speech.71 But one can regard persuadability as a
free speech virtue without valorizing those who are taken in by Russian
propaganda or the endless assault of disinformation from the Trump
White House.
In fact, a failure to acknowledge and explore persuadability can
have its own radicalizing effects. If changing one’s mind is not seen as a
normal—even desirable—outcome of a discussion, then the threshold
for doing so will undoubtedly be higher. If a person who has changed
her mind faces pressure to justify doing so, she will almost inevitably be
pushed (even if only internally) either to refuse the change or to
exaggerate both the weaknesses of her prior belief and the strengths of
the new one. And if one can only adopt a new idea with the zeal of the
converted, as opposed to the curiosity of the seeker, it is not hard to
imagine how knowledge, discourse, and democracy will all be distorted.
This negative view is, admittedly, consistent with much of Holmes’s
own writing—he sometimes described persuasion as a kind of combat,
in which to be persuaded was to be defeated. After all, even amid his
own conversion into the Justice who would pen the Abrams dissent, he
wrote to Hand that “man’s destiny is to fight. Therefore take thy place
on the one side or the other, if with the added grace of knowing that the
enemy is as good a man as thou, so much the better, but kill him if thou
canst.”72 He then professed agreement with Hand’s latest letter to him—
the one, cited above, which linked tolerance and incredulity.73
In the very next paragraph of that letter, Holmes returned to his
“can’t help” formulation of truth, echoing almost word-for-word the
letter to Pollock cited above:
When I say a thing is true I mean that I can’t help believing it—
and nothing more. But as I observe that the Cosmos is not
always limited by my Cant Helps I don’t bother about absolute
truth or even inquire whether there is such a thing, but define
the Truth as the system of my limitations. I may add that as
other men are subject to a certain number, but not all, of my
Cant Helps, intercourse is possible. When I was young I used
to define the truth as the majority vote of the nation that can
lick all others. So we may define the present war as an inquiry
concerning truth.74
71

HOLMES, supra note 8, at 487.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., J., Sup. Ct., to Learned Hand, J., U.S. Dist.
Court, S.D.N.Y. (June 24, 1918) [hereinafter Holmes-Hand Letter] (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library), https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:4309758
0$18i.
73 See Weinstein, supra note 24, at 69.
74 See Holmes-Hand Letter, supra note 72.
72
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Others in Holmes’s intellectual milieu employed similarly militaristic
metaphors, perhaps most notably Milton in Areopagitica: “Let [truth]
and falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free
and open encounter?” 75
In this frame, changes in belief represent defeat, rather than
growth, and it should not be surprising if people are reluctant to own up
to them. And yet, as Felix Frankfurter, one of Holmes’s self-styled
proteges, once put it: “Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought
not to reject it merely because it comes late.”76 The question is how
social practices and law itself can keep the door open for later-arriving
wisdom, especially if admitting it would mean displacing existing
beliefs.
In fact, law has probably done more than most disciplines to
grapple with the practice of persuasion. But understanding what it
takes to persuade is different from understanding what it takes to be
persuaded. And that makes sense, at least for training lawyers, because
mostly their job is to serve as advocates—to persuade a judge, for
example—not to be persuaded by opposing counsel. But the result may
be that we focus on rhetoric77—which no less authority than Aristotle
defined as “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available
means of persuasion”78—rather than the other side of the equation:
what it means to be persuaded, to be a consumer rather than producer
of rhetoric.
Within legal discourse, the more fruitful place to find the principle
of persuadability at work is on the bench, not in the bar. Judges, after
all, are not cast as advocates, but are expected to approach evidence and
arguments with an open mind, and also (and more significantly for
present purposes) to tailor or alter their beliefs accordingly. The law
has devoted substantial energy to exploring and explaining the
appropriate bases for such changes.

75

JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING 45 (H.B.
Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co. 1959) (1644). See also Vincent Blasi, A Readers Guide to
John Milton’s Areopagitica, the Foundational Essay of the First Amendment Tradition,
2017 SUP. CT. REV. 273.
76 Henslee v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
77 See supra note 17 and sources cited therein. Holmes attended law school at a time
when rhetoric was still a standard part of the law school curriculum in many places,
though it would soon be phased out as part of the Langdellian revolution. Linda Levine
& Kurt M. Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 108, 111 (1993) (internal
footnotes omitted).
78 1 ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 37 (George A. Kennedy, trans.,
2007).
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It is clear, of course, that courts as institutions “change their
minds,” and sometimes—as when they overturn a precedent—they do
so explicitly and give reasons. But, more notably for present purposes,
even specific judges sometimes have a change of heart, and vote to
overturn a precedent that they helped write into law. Holmes’s own
opinion in Abrams is a signal example, as explained above. (Somewhat
ironically, perhaps, Hand and Frankfurter themselves seemed to change
their minds in the other direction, writing First Amendment opinions in
United States v. Dennis that went a long way to eviscerating the
principles Holmes laid out in Abrams.79)
But other examples are not hard to find. Justice Thomas did so in
Apprendi v. New Jersey,80 noting that he regretted his vote for the
majority conclusion in Almendarez-Torres v. United States just two years
earlier.81 Justice Marshall voted with the majority in Terry v. Ohio, but
only four years later he concluded in dissent in Adams v. Williams that
“the delicate balance that Terry struck was simply too delicate, too
susceptible to the ‘hydraulic pressures’ of the day.”82 In the First
Amendment context, Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in Roth
v. United States83 but wrote (in dissent) in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton
that he regretted it.84 Some judges declare their changes of heart after
having left the bench.85
Of course, it would be too much to say that such changes—or at
least such candor—is the norm for judges, even if it might be desirable.86
Perhaps scholars might consider looking closer to home.
79 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 213 (1950) (Hand, J.) (upholding convictions of
Communist organizers on the basis that they presented a “clear and present” danger).
80 530 U.S. 466, 520–21 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
81 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
82 407 U.S. 143, 162 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
84 413 U.S. 49, 73–74 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85 See, e.g., MICHAEL GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF THE
JUDICIAL RIGHT 213 (2017) (noting reports that Justice Lewis Powell initially changed his
mind in joining the Bowers v. Hardwick majority, and that four years later he said he
“probably made a mistake in voting with the majority”); RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS
ON JUDGING 84–85 (2013) (“I plead guilty to having written the majority opinion
upholding Indiana’s requirement that prospective voters prove their identity with a
photo ID—a type of law now widely regarded as a means of voter suppression rather
than fraud prevention.”); JOHN PAUL STEVENS, THE MAKING OF A JUSTICE: MY FIRST NINETY FOUR
YEARS (2019) (noting a “somewhat embarrassing to acknowledge” misreading of a line
of cases in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
86 Jeffrey S. Sutton, Barnette, Frankfurter, and Judicial Review, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 133,
149 (2012) (“Judges are not known for admitting their mistakes, and perhaps that is a
tradition that should change. In any given year, I sit on roughly ten to twenty cases that
reverse decisions of district court judges. Is it not possible that appellate judges and
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III. THINGSTERS, IDEASTS, AND PERSUADABILITY IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
In 2019, Harvard Law School held an event called “Why I Changed
My Mind.”87 In a panel discussion, four members of the law faculty
described things about which they had changed their minds—matters
like the private purposes interpretation of the Second Amendment
(Laurence Tribe) and the complexity of William Jennings Bryan (Jill
Lepore). The panel was well-attended, and there was some talk of
making it an annual event. But how, one might ask, will they fill another
panel?
The question is serious in two ways: it is genuine, in the sense that
it is legitimately difficult to identify scholars who have openly
repudiated views they once held, and it is potentially important, in the
sense that it may shed some light on how scholars—or scholarly
discourse—change over time in response to new ideas.
The connection to Abrams and the preceding discussion should
hopefully be plain. If there is any area of discourse in which the
“competition of ideas” is front and center, and “fighting faiths” regularly
upset, one might expect it to be academia. But, again borrowing from
Abrams, when do we “realize” that fact and when do we “come to
believe” anything different than what we already do? Or was Holmes
right to say (as he did when urging Frankfurter to steer clear of it) that
“academic life is but half life—it is a withdrawal from the fight in order
to utter smart things that cost you nothing except the thinking them
from a cloister”?88
Unsurprisingly, Holmes’s description strikes me, and presumably
most of us who have chosen the half life, as a bit unfair. A scholarly
symposium or debate-in-print is hardly Antietam (one of three Civil War
battles in which Holmes was wounded89) or even a courtroom, for that
matter—but there are stakes, and a “fight.” It is, at its best, the ideal
form of the “competition of the market” that Abrams celebrates. And, in
justices have similar rates of error?”). Not everyone agrees that such candor would be
desirable. Charles Lane, Judge Richard Posner’s Mea Culpa Was Better Left Unsaid, WASH.
POST, Oct. 21, 2013 (“If it is realistic to be skeptical about judges’ capacity for deciding
cases objectively, why should we trust their subsequent claims of error?”).
87 Laurence Tribe, Jill Lepore, Jeannie Suk Gersen & Kendra Albert, Professors,
Harvard University, Panel Discussion at Harvard Law School: Why I Changed My Mind
(Mar. 4, 2019) (recording available at HARV. L. TODAY, https://today.law.harvard.edu/
why-i-changed-my-mind/)
88 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Felix Frankfurter (July 15, 1913), in
HOLMES AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912–1934, at 12–13 (Robert M.
Mennel & Christine L. Compston eds., 1996).
89 Holmes’s father wrote a somewhat overwrought postscript, “My Hunt for the
Captain,” which was published in the Atlantic Monthly and for which his son never quite
forgave him. BUDIANSKY, supra note 19, at 97–99.
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keeping with the present theme, things change in the legal academy.
Schools of thought rise and fall, often in direct opposition or repudiation
of what preceded them.
How that change happens is far, far beyond the scope of this Essay
or the abilities of its author to address. My goal is not to attempt any
novel intervention into the literature on intellectual history or the life
cycles of legal theory90 but rather to locate in legal scholarship a
principle that I have argued is important to free speech—persuadability.
In particular, I hope to identify and explore incidents like the Harvard
panel, wherein scholars do what Holmes stopped short of doing in
Abrams—experience persuasion and acknowledge it.
I do not mean to suggest that law is a unique or uniquely
problematic scholarly debate in this regard. One could ask similar
questions all over campus. Sometimes philosophers renounce their
frameworks,91 or empiricists issue revisions or admit errors in their
data. In fact, in recent years, there have been a few notable efforts to
encourage social scientists to alter or reject their own prior conclusions
when appropriate,92 or to “[t]rack[] retractions as a window into the
scientific process.”93 But even the former has been described as an
effort to “create a radical new culture.”94
What is true in other disciplines seems to be true in law as well:
legal scholars rarely acknowledge when or why they have changed their
minds. This is admittedly a hard claim to prove, and I make it with some
hesitation. Although I have researched the question as best I can and
relied on reference librarians, colleagues, research assistants, and
patient friends to provide examples, I am quite conscious that I might be
missing obvious ones, and that readers might at this very moment be

90 For one recent and insightful account within the legal literature, see Jeremy K.
Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal
Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819 (2016). See also, of course, DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND
FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (1998).
91 Ludwig Wittgenstein, to take one obvious example, spent the second half of his
career attempting to demolish what he had done in the first with the Tractatus. He
described Philosophical Investigations as a rejoinder to “what logicians have said about
the structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)”
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 23 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed.
1969) (1953).
92 Julia M. Rohrer, et al., Putting the Self in Self-Correction: Findings from the Loss-ofConfidence Project, PsyArXiv (Dec. 12, 2018), https://psyarxiv.com/exmb2/.
93 RETRACTION WATCH, https://retractionwatch.com/ (last visited June 21, 2019).
94 Brian Resnick, Intellectual Humility: The Importance of Knowing You Might Be
Wrong, VOX (Jan. 4, 2019, 8:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/science-andhealth/2019/1/4/17989224/intellectual-humility-explained-psychologyreplication.
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compiling lists. If so, and in keeping with the theme, I admit the error
and invite the corrections.
But I should note that what I have in mind are not the many
scholars whose corpus contains inconsistencies: who argued X at one
point and later argued Y (or even not-X), without necessarily
acknowledging the change. Many successful scholars with a large
enough oeuvre, and who have defeated the hobgoblin,95 will exhibit and
even celebrate such inconsistencies.96
This Essay is concerned with a certain subset of those cases—those
in which a scholar believed something, was later convinced otherwise,
and (this is the hardest part to find) acknowledged the change.97
Illustrations of these are hard to come by, though again the difficulty of
constructing a search may be partially to blame. The ready examples
tend to be those one has noticed in passing. In First Amendment
scholarship, two examples come immediately to mind.
First, in a footnote of Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, then-Professor Elena
Kagan noted that she had become un-persuaded by an argument she
relied on just four years earlier.98 Specifically, she noted the argument
(citing Alexander Meiklejohn and her colleague Geoffrey Stone) that the
purpose of the First Amendment’s content-neutrality rule is to protect
the “thinking processes of the community” from distortion.99 She went
on: “I used the argument with respect to R.A.V. in [Elena Kagan, The
Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v St. Paul, Rust v
Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 S. CT.
95 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS AND ENGLISH TRAITS 63, 70 (C.W. Eliot
ed., 1909) (“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little
statesmen and philosophers and divines.”). Emerson, a friend of Holmes’s father, was
something of a mentor. BUDIANSKY, supra note 19, at 58–61, 152–53.
96 See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Tushnet’s Realism, Tushnet’s Liberalism, 90 GEO. L.J. 199,
208–13 (2001) (charting apparent changes in Mark Tushnet’s scholarship); James M.
Oleske, Jr., The Born-Again Champion of Conscience, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 78 (2015)
(“[W]hile today [Robert] George waxes nostalgic about the widespread denunciation of
[Employment Division v.] Smith, in 1998 he praised the decision as ‘impeccably faithful
to the original meaning of the ‘Free Exercise Clause.’”).
97 See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, Summers’s Primer on Fuller’s Jurisprudence—A
Wholly Disinterested Assessment of the Reviews by Professors Wueste and Lebel, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 1231, 1234 (1986) (“Several years ago, when I reread Fuller prior to
writing my book on his work, I had a change of mind. I now believe that Fuller’s
principles of legality do have a justified claim to being a morality.”).
98 Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 418–19 n.15 (1996) (citing Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM & MARY L. REV. 189, 198
(1983)).
99 Id.
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REV. 29, 69–71]. As will become clear, I now find the argument
unpersuasive, both in its application to R.A.V. and more broadly.”100
Much of the rest of the Article proceeded to clarify how she came to
believe that “only the purpose-based model can explain the difference in
the levels of review applicable to content-based and content-neutral
laws.”101
Tim Scanlon has been, if anything, even more exasperated by the
prominence of his own prior view, and his inability now to denounce it:
A rant: Can we please stop talking about autonomy? If we were
to look for a single idea that captures the interests at stake in
expression that merits First Amendment protection, the idea
of autonomy would be a bad choice for this role. (As someone
who once made a mistaken appeal to autonomy as the
centerpiece of a theory of freedom of expression, my position
in the Dantean Inferno of free speech debates seems to be
repeatedly assailed with misuses of this notion, no matter how
I criticize them.)102
A footnote obligingly provides sources for the Scanlon v. Scanlon debate:
“See generally Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 151, 204 (1972). I criticize the view presented in that
article in T.M. Scanlon, Content Regulation Reconsidered, in T.M. SCANLON,
THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE 151, 161–64 (2003).”103
Where should one hope to find other similar examples of scholars
who have repudiated their own prior views? What kinds of change
might we expect to see? Again, this Essay cannot hope to provide a
comprehensive account, but only to sketch a few possible routes. And
indeed, Holmes himself suggested a distinction that might help guide the
search.
He once posited a difference between “Ideasts” and
“Thingsters”104—those who theorize, and those who master facts. He
placed himself squarely in the former category;105 Justice Brandeis
would be exemplary of the latter.
The academy, too, has its Ideasts and Thingsters, and it seems
plausible that they are persuadable in different ways. Thingsters are
more likely to make claims about bodies of discernible facts and to rely
100

Id.
Id. at 456 (emphasis added).
102 T.M. Scanlon, Why Not Base Free Speech on Autonomy or Democracy?, 97 VA. L.
REV. 541, 546 (2011) (footnote omitted).
103 Id. at n.15.
104 HEALY, supra note 15, at 140.
105 Id. (“[A]lthough Holmes recognized the value of facts, he personally despised
them. It was one of the biases he inherited from his father, who complained that facts
choked his windpipe when he talked.”).
101
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on standard scientific hypotheses. Precisely because they tend to make
scholarly claims that are more easily susceptible to proof, they are more
likely to be confronted with evidence and arguments that could
effectively force an acknowledgment of a changed view. This is true, for
example, of historians who misunderstand106 or misrepresent107 their
source material, or quantitative empiricists who do the same with
data.108
One might think of this as simple error correction, a matter of
“proof” rather than “persuasion,” but it is not clear that the two can be
easily separated.109 For Thingsters with fact-dependent “can’t helps,”
changed facts change truths—a completed mathematical proof, a newly
discovered species, or a cured disease, for example. Such changes might
not be immediate or simple, of course—the history and philosophy of
science is its own discipline, after all—and existing paradigms might be
able to absorb a great deal of apparently conflicting information before
they are forced to shift.110 But for a Thingster with an optimistic
epistemological vision, such shifts can be acknowledged and celebrated
as another step toward “true” understanding.
For Ideasts, the situation is a little bit different. The general
theories that Holmes said are the Ideasts’ focus probably tend to be less
susceptible to proof and closer to the kinds of “deep-seated preferences”
that Holmes suspected are not worth debating, at least if the goal is to
change someone’s mind.111 Ideasts’ debates tend to the normative,
rather than descriptive, which complicates the possibility of persuasion.
Convincing someone that their facts are wrong is one thing; convincing
them to revise their vision of the good is another.
106 As I write this, the latest kerfuffle involves Naomi Wolf’s Outrages (2019),
which—she acknowledged, when confronted with them during a live interview—
contains significant mistakes stemming from her misunderstanding of the words “death
recorded” in Victorian court records. Wolf’s response: “It’s such an important story and
I welcome the chance to correct these two out of hundreds of citations and make it
perfect.” Parul Sehgal, Naomi Wolf’s Career of Blunders Continues in ‘Outrages’, N.Y. TIMES,
(June 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/books/review-outragesnaomi-wolf.html.
107 See, e.g., James Lindgren, Fall from Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles
Scandal, 111 YALE L.J. 2195 (2002).
108 See RETRACTION WATCH, supra note 93 (collecting examples of errors,
misrepresentations, and fraud in scientific research).
109 Colin Starger, Constitutional Law and Rhetoric, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1347, 1359
(2016) (“[I]t is important to recall that pisteis-the word Aristotle used to describe the
rhetorical genus uniting the species of logos, ethos, and pathos— can also be translated
as ‘proof.’ Using the same word to describe proof and persuasion hammers home the
rhetorical perspective on discourse: proof is what persuades.”).
110 See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996).
111 Holmes, supra note 26, at 41.
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I do not mean to suggest that Thingsters are more persuadable
than Ideasts, nor that seemingly fact-bound arguments are free from
normative priors and motivated reasoning. The point is simply to
highlight that persuadability may look different to Thingsters and
Ideasts. And even then, the difference is one of degree rather than kind.
In choosing which facts to master, and what questions to pursue,
Thingsters are guided by general theories. And Ideast propositions—
even basic constitutional principles like the marketplace of ideas112—
sometimes rest on Thingster-type suppositions. One of the original
promises of originalism, to take one example, can be understood as an
effort to transform a debate between Ideasts into one between
Thingsters—a search for historical “facts,” not normative visions of
constitutional interpretation. Whether this promise has been or can be
fulfilled is a debate for another day. For present purposes, what stands
out are the general efforts to “empiricize” originalism, including recently
through corpus linguistics, which can make it possible to evaluate
originalist queries in a data-driven way.113
To be clear, I am not suggesting that constitutional law or
constitutional scholarship can or should be reduced to a system of
proofs. What Holmes said of people is true also of constitutional law:
“[T]he logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for
repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion,
and repose is not the destiny of man.”114 The point is simply that
112 See Frederick Schauer, Discourse and Its Discontents, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309,
1333 (1997) (“A great deal of free speech theory and a great deal of discourse theory is
marked by an admirable epistemological optimism, but whether that epistemological
optimism is well-founded is in the final analysis an empirical question, as to which the
resources of contemporary social science research might help to locate an answer.”);
Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1160,
1160 (2015) (noting that while there is “at best mixed evidence for the [marketplace]
metaphor’s veracity,” and reporting empirical study of “buffer zones” at polling places
or abortion clinics).
113 Dennis Baron, Corpus Evidence Illuminates the Meaning of Bear Arms, 46 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 509 (2019); Josh Blackman & James C. Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and the
Second Amendment, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Aug. 7, 2018), https://blog.harvardlaw
review.org/corpus-linguistics-and-the-second-amendment/ (noting that the authors
were “persuaded by” Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008), but that “[a]pplying corpus linguistics to the Second Amendment
leads to potentially uncomfortable criticisms for both the majority and dissenting
opinions in Heller”); Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “bear”,
LAWNLINGUISTICS, (Dec. 16, 2018), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2018/12/16/corporaand-the-second-amendment-bear/; Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Semantics and the
Meaning of the Second Amendment, THE PANORAMA (Aug. 3, 2018), http://the
panorama.shear.org/2018/08/03/historical-semantics-and-the-meaning-of-thesecond-amendment/.
114 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).
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whether one is looking for normative persuasion or a demonstration of
proof, legal scholarship seems to offer few open changes of mind.
Assuming this is to be true—it is, again, a Thingster-type claim subject
to disproof—it raises a question. Why do scholars write as if to
persuade, and yet so rarely admit to being persuaded? Should scholars
more openly acknowledge—and explain—the times when their minds
have been changed?
For one thing, persuasion is not the only thing that a scholar
(especially a young scholar) might want to maximize in her career. If
one wants to engage with other scholars, and not necessarily to convert
or conquer them, then it makes sense to pursue issues for which the
battlefield is already well set. That might mean spending time in an
intellectual trench, without dislodging anyone else from theirs, but
scholars might still glean whatever is “divine” in academic battles.115
And persuasion is not the only way, perhaps not even the most
effective way, to exert scholarly influence. An alternative, of course, is
to speak to those who are not yet on the battlefield—to reach the minds
that are not yet made up. The underlying premise of the second
approach is that made-up minds are unlikely to change and that the key
to scholarly change is to reach new audiences. Justice Scalia might not
have won many converts to originalism among those with welldeveloped views on constitutional interpretation, but generations of
law students—his primary audience, he often said116—have now been
baptized in it.
An academic discourse in which scholars do not change positions
is still one in which influence can be had, and certain ideas prevail over
others. Students and scholars who have not yet developed their own
positions might well be won over by one side or another in a scholarly
debate about, say, originalism. But in doing so, they will not necessarily
have received any guidance or incentive to grow any further—to open
themselves up to subsequent change. Perhaps a discourse in which
scholars themselves do not just describe but demonstrate the virtues of
persuadability would encourage and teach others to do the same.
While many incentives are admittedly against it, I think there is
much to like about a system in which scholars—Thingsters, Ideasts, and
everyone in between—more commonly acknowledge and explain their
115

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Life Struggle, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM
THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.

94, 95 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) (“Life is a roar of bargain and battle, but in the very
heart of it there rises a mystic spiritual tone that gives meaning to the whole.”).
116 See, e.g., Adam J. White, Antonin Scalia, Legal Educator, 33 NAT’L AFFAIRS (2017)
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/antonin-scalia-legal-educator.
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changes of heart. Those reasons (suspicions might be a better word)
track, in large part, those recounted above as to why open
persuadability might be a virtue for a broader system of free speech.117
For one thing, it might help create a scholarly discourse that is more selfconsciously persuasive and persuadable. If (and this is of course an if)
the goal of scholarly discourse is to provide the “best test” of truth, then
presumably we should be the ones willing and able to “accept” it.
For this to happen, it is useful, though not essential, for scholars
explicitly to change over time and to explain why. As Kagan and Scanlon
do in the examples quoted above, explaining why one has changed one’s
mind is not only fair to the author/creator of the persuasive argument—
it gives credit where credit is due—but also helps identify and teach the
kinds of arguments that are successful in changing individual minds.
Moreover, to the degree that law professors describe and extol the
value of open-mindedness and persuadability—celebrating the
tendency of a legal education to open and stretch students’ minds, and
sometimes bemoaning students’ perceived unwillingness to be
confronted with distasteful ideas—we might as well model it ourselves.
If the marketplace of ideas is to be modeled, not just described, then one
would hope and expect to see scholars noting and explaining the points
in the “competition” when they “came to realize” that their own “fighting
faiths” could be displaced.
Why, then, does this occur so rarely in law reviews? Surely the
answers vary from scholar to scholar, school to school, and field to field,
but one can at least imagine a range of explanations.
The obvious one is that there is nothing to acknowledge: one
doesn’t read of scholars having changes of mind because their minds
don’t change. This is of course the explanation suggested by Part I
above, and from my perspective it is discouraging—not so much for the
development of legal scholarship as a whole (it can and will continue to
change, for all the reasons described above), but for the scholars who
entered the academy nominally seeking truth only to behave as if they
arrived in full possession of it.
Another is that individual intellectual change comes gradually and
incrementally, not all at once, such that it is difficult to pinpoint the
moment at which one’s mind “changed”—just as it might be hard to
identify with precision the point on a spectrum at which red shades into
blue. Relatedly, scholars might believe that their own internal
intellectual development is simply not newsworthy, as it were—that
their own voyages of intellectual self-discovery need not be explained to
117

See supra Section II.0
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anyone else.
But to the degree that scholars hold back on
acknowledging their development, that seems to be a lost opportunity
to provide a map to the roads they can’t help traveling.
IV. CONCLUSION
Holmes’s First Amendment opinions were handed down at a time
of incredible national anxiety. Many of them—Abrams very much
included—involved speech about wars, the draft, anarchy, and the very
future of the United States. It is easy, at a century removed and with a
new set of anxieties, to lose track of how significant those challenges
must have seemed and how high the stakes: it was not the First
Amendment at stake but the nation.
How far away, and yet how familiar. Our contemporary anxieties
and challenges have different roots, but they are again imbricated with
issues of free speech. Many feel that the nation is again under threat,
both from within and without, and that the main threats include
tribalism, closed-mindedness, and a loss of faith in the very nature of
truth. Abrams is a major part of that discussion. But the part of the
opinion that might be most relevant is not its concept of “truth,” but its
treatment of persuadability.
Appropriately enough, that theme can be summed up by an
internet meme. In 2018, a conservative comedian and commentator
Tweeted a picture of himself seated on a university campus, sipping a
cup of coffee, behind a table with a sign on it reading: “Male Privilege is
a Myth—Change My Mind.”118 In short order, hundreds of internet
parodies popped up, Photoshopping in other absurd topics of
persuasion.119 It might not be the shout of fire in a crowded theater, but
the image of a person defiantly challenging others to change his mind
deserves a place in the First Amendment iconography as well.

118

Steven Crowder (@scrowder), TWITTER, (Feb. 16, 2018, 2:09 PM),
https://twitter.com/scrowder/status/964577508447449088.
119 Among the less profane examples: “Australians are Just British Texans”; “Pluto is
a planet”; “I’m a bad person And deserve to die”; “Spring is Here.” Steven Crowder’s
“Change My Mind” Campus Sign Images, KNOWYOURMEME, https://knowyourmeme.com/
memes/steven-crowders-change-my-mind-campus-sign (last visited Jul 29, 2019).

